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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KARYL I. McKEAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
THOMAS M. McKEAN, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
CASE NO. 13954 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff Karyl I. McKean 
from a decree of divorce entered in the Third District Court 
by the Honorable Ernest R. Baldwin and from his denial of her 
motion to alter or amend judgment, or in the alternative for 
a new trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court entered a decree of divorce for both 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the Defendant and the Plaintiff in this action. Thereafter, 
Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend judgment or in the 
alternative for a new trial. Except for minor modifications, 
this motion is denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on April 3, 1948. 
This divorce action was filed in June, 1973, and the decree 
of divorce finally entered on the 18th of November, 1974. At 
the time of the divorce trial there were two minor children 
living at home, Scott T. McKean and Sara Liza McKean. 
As pointed out in Appellant1s brief, Defendant Thomas 
A. McKean is employed as a sales manager for Cate Equipment 
Company. Plaintiff Karyl I. McKean has been employed as a 
secretary to the Superintendent of Transportation in the Utah 
Parks and as a sales representative for Avon Products. The 
latter job was held by her from the summer of 1970 through 
February of 1973 (TR. 109). During a part of her employment 
with Avon Products, she enjoyed the position of team captain, 
charged with the supervision of seventeen representatives 
(TR. 167). 
It is true that Plaintiff submitted a report letter from 
Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, M.D. (Exhibit 21P) wherein the doctor 
noted that due to the fracture of Mrs. McKean!s wrist, "she 
still has moderate stiffness of the wrist and fingers and some 
pain." The doctor then went on to find that he anticipated ap-
proximately a 10% permanent loss of function of the hand and 
wrist. Notwithstanding, this disability, it is apparent 
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Plaintifffs ability to type is not seriously impeded as she 
typed numerous trial exhibits including inventories of pro-
perty and recapitulations of expenses (TR. 84-85, See Exhibits 
5P, 6P, 7P, 8P, IIP, 12P, 15P and 17P). 
In the decree of divorce the trial judge effectively 
divided the property of the parties with 507o awarded to the 
Plaintiff and 507o awarded to the Defendant. Plaintiff had the 
further right to remain in the home of the parties until the 
last minor child reaches majority or Plaintiff remarries, at 
which time the home is to be sold and Defendant is to receive 
his portion of the equity. The home is paid for and Plaintiff's 
only obligation while living there is for maintenance and taxes 
(TR. 52). 
Defendant was found to be earning a net monthly income 
of $1200 not including bonuses. Plaintiff was awarded alimony 
in the amount of $300 per month plus child support in the amount 
of $150 per child per month for a total of $600 per month. In 




THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ITS FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH SUPPORT 
A DECREE OF DIVORCE IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
The trial court's findings of fact are supported by the 
evidence and are sufficient to support the award of a decree of 
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divorce to Defendant. 
The burden is upon the Appellant to show error in the 
court below, as in divorce proceedings, the trial court's 
order and findings are endowed with a presumption of validity. 
(Stone v. Stone, 19 Ut.2d 378, 380, 431 P.2d 802, 803 (1967)). 
It has long been recognized that the presiding judge 
in the trial court is in the best position to judge the credi-
bility of witnesses and to appropriately weigh the evidence 
introduced at trial. This rule of review was enunciated by the 
court in Greener v. Greener, 116 Ut.571, 212 P.2d 194 (1949), 
where the court stated: 
The trial judge had the witnesses before 
him. He could note their demeanor on the stand, 
judge their ability to register and retain im-
pressions and to transmit them intelligently and 
to their candor or lack of it. In cases in which 
the emotions of the parties are apt to influence 
their testimony, the opportunity to observe them 
in the courtroom and especially on the witness 
stand is of great importance. (116 Ut. at 585, 
212 P.2d at 202). 
Furthermore, in a case where the evidence is in conflict, 
an appellate court will assume that the trial court believed the 
evidence which supports the finding, and will view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. (Stone, 
supra, 19 lit. 2d at 380, 431 P. 2d at 803). 
With these rules of review in mind, the findings and 
order of the trial court in a divorce proceeding will be modi-
fied only if the evidence clearly preponderates against them 
or unless the decree is grossly inequitable. (Christensen v. 
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Christensen, 21 Ut.2d 263, 265, 444 P.2d 511, 512 (1969)). 
Plaintiff-Appellant alleges that the evidence does not 
support Finding No. 4 (TR, 61). This argument appears to be 
based on three allegations: (1) That Plaintff's testimony 
effectively rebutted Defendant's testimony to the effect that 
she had not performed her marital duties; (2) That Defendant 
did not testify as to the emotional distress he suffered as a 
result of Plaintiff's denial of sexual relations; and (3) That 
explicit testimony about fights or arguments is absent. 
As to the first allegation, when an appellate court is 
presented with a conflict in evidence, the court will assume 
the trial judge believed the evidence which supports the find-
ing. Plaintff concedes that Defendant gave testimony to sup-
port this finding. Thus, in this case, it must be assumed that 
the trial judge accepted the testimony of the Defendant, rather 
than that of the Plaintiff on this issue. 
The fact that Defendant did not provide explicit testi-
mony about the emotional distress suffered as a result of 
Plaintiff's denial of conjugal relations does not compel a 
modification of the trial court's finding. It would seem that 
the trial judge could take judicial notice of the fact that 
denial of sexual relations caused the Defendant emotional dis-
tress . 
The trial judge was in a position to note the demeanor 
of the Defendant at the time he testified to the lack of physical 
affection on the part of his wife. Furthermore, the trial judge 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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could draw on his knowledge of the circumstances surrounding 
the dissolution of the marital relationship and upon any evidence 
which was relevant to the character of the relationship prior 
to its breakdown. Thus, the inference that Defendant suffered 
emotional distress is not unsupported. 
Plaintiff-Appellant's third allegation, that the finding 
that Plaintiff upset Defendant in arguments and fights is 
without support, must likewise fail. The Plaintiff herself 
testified to the existance of severe marital discord (TR. 171). 
Again, the advantaged position of the trial judge should 
be recognized, and the findings of the trial court will not be 
modified absent evidence which clearly preponderates against 
them. 
Findings of Fact Nos. 3 and 4 are not in logical con-
flict with each other. Both parties testified that their 
amorous advances were refused by the other party. (TR. 122, 
196, 197, 246). The testimony contemplates separate occur-
ences. As the refusals occurred at different times, each party 
could have suffered emotional distress upon refusal by the 
other party and yet have failed to respond to the other party's 
advances on a subsequent occasion. 
The findings and judgment of the trial court should be 
modified only if the evidence clearly preponderates against 
them or the decree works such an injustice that equity and 
good conscience demand revision. Such is not the case here. 
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POINT II 
THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT AWARDED PLAINTIFF WAS 
BOTH PROPER AND WITHIN THE COURT'S DISCRETION 
In an action for divorce, the trial court has wide dis-
cretion in fashioning an award of alimony and child support. Its 
decision will not be modified on appeal absent clear injustice 
or inequity which amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
. In Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Ut.2d 286, 422 P.2d 192 
(1967) the court recognized the great degree of discretion al-
lowed the trial court and noted the limited circumstances under 
which the judgment might be modified. The court stated: 
...the policy to which we adhere...[is]... 
to the effect that the trial judge has consider-
able latitude of discretion in ...[divorce cases] 
... and that his judgment should not be changed 
lightly, and in fact, not at all, unless it works 
such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indi-
cate a clear abuse of discretion. (18 Ut.2d at 
287, 427 P.2d at 192, 193) (emphasis added). 
Although in Anderson, supra, the court considered only 
the division of property and an award of alimony, the standard 
is much the same for review of a child support award, as is 
reflected in Knighton v. Knighton, 15 Ut.2d 55, 387 P.2d 91 
(1963). In Knighton, the court stated, in reference to the 
amount of child support: 
... [t]his court should indulge every pre-
sumption in favor of sustaining the action of the 
trial court and will be reluctant to interfere 
therewith, doing so only for the clearest abuse 
of discretion or violation of established princi-
ples of law. (15 Ut,2d at 56, 387 P.2d at 92). 
In this case Plaintiff argues, in essence, that modifi-
cation of the decree is in order because Plaintiff may receive 
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less than one-half of Defendants total net income because she 
has to pay taxes on a portion of what she receives. 
What Plaintiff has failed to consider is that child 
support payments received by her from Defendant are taxable 
to Defendant, not the Plaintiff. 
Even if it is assumed that Plaintiff will receive less 
than one-half of Defendant's income, this is not a basis for 
overturning the trial court!s order. 
The award of alimony and child support is based on 
various factors, including the duration of the marriage, the 
ages of the parties, their standard of living, considerations 
relative to the children, the money and property they possess 
and how it was acquired, and their present and potential incomes. 
(Anderson, supra, 18 U.2d at 287, 422 P.2d at 192). The trial 
court judge is in the best position to ascertain and evaluate 
these relevant circumstances. 
At no time has this court called for calculation of 
alimony and child support solely on a proportionate basis. In 
each case the needs of the parties and the children are con-
sidered. 
Plaintiff does not assert that the alimony and child 
support award of the trial court is inadequate in view of the 
needs of Plaintiff and her children, only that Defendant may 
retain more than one-half of his earnings. 
The trial court considered the needs and requirements 
of the parties in calculating alimony and child support. Its 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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analysis should remain undisturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ITS DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY 
An equitable division of marital property is developed 
through an examination of the relevant circumstances in each 
particular case rather than through application of an arith-
metical percentage. (Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Ut.2d 79, 82, 296 
P.2d 977, 979 (1956). 
Analysis of the relevant circumstances is within the 
province of the trial judge. Due to his advantaged position, 
he is given considerable latitude of discretion in the division 
of property. The decision of the trial court will not be 
modified unless it causes such clear injustice or inequity as 
to amount to an abuse of discretion. (Anderson v. Anderson, 
18 Ut.2d 286, 287, 422 P.2d 192, 192, 193 (1967)). 
This court has recoginzed the wide discretion of the 
trial court and the fact that differing circumstances require 
different allocations of marital property. In Blair v. Blair, 
40 Ut.306, 121 P.19 (1912), the court affirmed a property di-
vision which awarded only $4,500 to the wife while granting 
$40,000 to the husband. At the other end of the spectrum, in 
Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Ut.2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956), the court 
affirmed an award of in excess of $20,000 to the wife and ap-
proximately $500 to the husband. Clearly, division of marital 
property should not be bound to an inflexible percentage formula. 
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In the case at bar, the court effectively divided the 
property of the parties between them on the basis of 507o to 
the Plaintiff and 50% to the Defendant. The trial court did 
not accept the Plaintiff's contention that Defendant's interest 
in a retirement fund was an item of property which should be 
divided between the parties for a good reason. The retirement 
fund is not available to Mr. McKean until he retires at age 
65 or becomes permanently disabled (TR. 105-106). It has most 
of its assets tied into the stock market and the value it will 
have at the time it is finally available to Mr. McKean is some-
thing which cannot be established until it is available. The 
trial court considered the retirement fund in the nature of a 
source of future income from Defendant to insure the continued 
payment of alimony upon his retirement. It is for this reason 
that the decree of divorce provided that Min the event that 
Defendant should quit his job or in any way effect his receipt 
of his vested interest in the said retirement fund with his pre-
sent employer Cate Equipment Company, Defendant is ordered to 
notify the court and the Plaintiff immediately.M (TR. 54). In 
a sense, the retirement fund may be considered as future income 
for Defendant to insure the continued payment of alimony upon 
his retirement. Thus, Plaintiff benefits from the retirement 
fund as does the Defendant. This was the thought stated by the 
trial court at the hearing on Plaintiff's motion to alter or 
amend the judgment when the judge made this statement, "What 
I have observed, I have heard 50 of these since, that his 
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retirement fund went to her benefit if he did retire with that 
retirement coming, the benefits of what are received will go to 
apply to the support payments to the wife.11 (TR. 273). 
The division of the equity in the marital home with half 
to Plaintiff and half to Defendant and subject to her right of 
possession, is not inequitable. No evidence was presented at 
trial which indicates that Plaintiff must lower her standard 
of living upon sale of the home. Even is this were the case, 
division of marital property rests on numerous standards, rather 
than solely on the maintenance of one party at an accustomed 
social elevation. In this case the court took cognizance of 
those factors, and in the exercise of its discretion divided 
the marital property accordingly. 
Plaintiff has not argued that the division of property 
is inequitable, only that it may cause inconvenience. Incon-
venience does not compel modification of the decree of divorce. 
The discretion of the trial court has not been abused and the 
division of marital property should not be modified. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The award of attorneys!s fees lies within the wide dis-
cretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. (Bader v. Bader, 18 Ut.2d 
407, 409, 424 P.2d 150, 151 (1967)). In the case at hand there 
was no abuse of discretion. 
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In the exercise of it's discretion the trial court may 
consider all factors relevant to a certain issue. In this case 
the division of marital property left each party on essentially 
an equal footing in regard to liquid assets. Plaintiff receives 
approximately one-half of all Defendant's income, actual and 
potential. Finally, the trial court found that neither party 
was without fault in this action (TR. 60, 61). 
Under all of the foregoing circumstances, the order that 
each party be required to pay his or her own attorney's fees 
and costs is well within the discretion of the trial judge. 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED WITHIN THE BOUNDS 
OF ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewable only 
for abuse of discretion. (Uptown Appliance & Radio Co., Inc. 
v. Flint, 122 Ut. 298, 302-303, 249 P.2d 826, 828 (1952)). 
The standards of review applicable to the various allegations 
contained in Plaintiff's motion are set out in the matters 
argued above. Through application of these rules of review 
to the present case, it is clear there was no abuse of discre-
tion in the denial of Plaintiff's motion. The ruling of the 
trial court should remain undisturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the 
division of marital property, the award of alimony, child 
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support or attorney's fees, nor in its denial of Plaintifffs 
motion for a new trial. The trial court did not err in its 
award of divorce to Defendant. 
The above arguments make it clear that Plaintiff has 
not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to 
the findings and judgment of the trial court in a divorce 
action. On this basis the judgment of the court below should 
be affirmed. Plaintiff-Appellant!s request for a new trial 
should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JERMAN & DART 
B. L. DARTf JR. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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